The numerous recent declarations by various governments recognizing the State of Palestine appear to foreshadow its imminent birth. Yet, the twenty action points of the American Plan for Gaza clearly outline a precise, constitutive path—rather than a merely declaratory one. We are entering an advanced phase in the maturation of the international legal framework established by the Oslo Accords which, if successfully implemented, would have genuinely constitutive significance rather than purely symbolic value.
From Oslo to the present: a historical continuum
The Two-State Solution proposal came closest to realization with the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 at the White House by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, under the auspices of U.S. President Bill Clinton. Although those accords brought an end to the First Intifada, Arafat’s unreliability played a decisive role in the derailment of the Oslo process in 2000, when the Palestinian leader rejected the proposed territorial partition plan. That decision was followed by the resurgence of armed struggle—namely, the Second Intifada—carried out by terrorist groups affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization such as Fatah Tanzim, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Palestine Liberation Front, and Force 17.
The early 2000s nevertheless witnessed renewed diplomatic efforts. Spurred by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, the 2002 Arab League Summit in Beirut adopted a peace plan that envisaged an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the normalization of relations between Israel and all Arab states, contingent upon Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, and the implementation of UN General Assembly Resolution 194 concerning Palestinian refugees. The plan received support from influential figures in the international media, including columnist Thomas Friedman.
Around the same time, in response to the intensification of the Second Intifada, the United States, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the United Nations established the Quartet on the Middle East, chaired from 2007 by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The Quartet deserves recognition for the depth and clarity of the commitments it set forth for both parties, together with a clearly defined timeline for progress.
The Road Map and its enduring logic
The Quartet’s “Road Map” was built on two fundamental pillars: first, to promote Palestinian economic and institutional development and self-empowerment; second, to support a negotiated solution based on mutual recognition between two peoples and two States, living in security and prosperity. The European Union was among the leading actors in advancing this vision, as part of its broader commitment to a coherent European foreign and security policy.
In this light, the Meloni government’s approach appears consistent with the principles established by the 1993 Oslo Accords and reaffirmed in the Quartet’s 2002 Road Map. Amid the tragic circumstances currently engulfing the Middle East—with terrorism spreading under the direct sponsorship of an increasingly assertive Iran and its proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Islamic Jihad, and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces—Italy has long supported and actively promoted the creation of a Palestinian State grounded in the criteria outlined above.
The problem of premature recognition
At the same time, it is evident that several recent recognitions of a Palestinian State by Western partners have been declared hastily, often driven by domestic political considerations aimed at reassuring increasingly influential Muslim communities in Europe. Such moves have drawn criticism for inadvertently emboldening fundamentalist elements within those communities—for instance, groups advocating for the supremacy of sharia over national legal systems.
These premature recognitions, issued in the absence of a verifiable state entity, are considered by leading scholars of international law to be declaratory rather than constitutive in nature. As Professor Attila Tanzi observes in his Introduction to International Law (2022), there exists a real risk that such recognition could effectively freeze the process of Palestine’s admission as a full member of the United Nations.
It would be unrealistic to imagine the creation of a Palestinian State proceeding without the approval of the United States, which retains veto power in the UN Security Council—the body responsible for admitting new members to the international system. Let us recall that achieving such a milestone, an undeniably constitutive step in international law, took Italy nine years of negotiation during the Cold War due to East–West tensions.
Furthermore, Professor Tanzi notes the essential requirement of “the effective authority of a unified and independent government over a population settled on a politically unified territory”—a condition that, as of today, simply does not exist. The Palestinian National Authority exercises effective control only over the West Bank, not the entirety of Palestinian territory. Accordingly, Tanzi concludes, “one cannot but share the widely accepted view that recognition currently has a merely declaratory and not constitutive value, bearing political significance alone.”
Toward a realistic path forward
Under current conditions, the most realistic and coherent framework—albeit one requiring updates—remains the Quartet’s Road Map, rooted in the Oslo process. That framework still provides the strategic basis for a genuine contribution to the formation of a Palestinian State, as the outcome of an indispensable agreement between the parties in a conflict that has endured far too long.
According to the most authoritative academic interpretations, the path toward full international legal subjectivity for a new state entity necessarily includes a series of obligations that every state must assume before the international community. Precedents can be found in the decolonization processes of the 1960s, the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the emergence of its successor states, and the cases of South Sudan and Timor-Leste.
A prospective Palestinian State must be capable ab initio of assuming fundamental responsibilities: respecting the sovereignty of other states; combating terrorism through the legitimate use of force; and upholding human rights and the rule of law. Only then could its establishment be truly constitutive in the fullest sense of international law.
Giulio Terzi di Sant’Agata